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Abstract
This thesis explores the opportunities and constraints for the adoption of a post-growth econ-
omy as a plausible approach towards sustainability by social movements. With the transdis-
ciplinary perspective of sustainability science, the qualitative study of social movements and 
post-growth states that Germany does not have a post-growth movement. Nevertheless, the 
environmental movement and, in particular, Friends of the Earth Germany are suitable candi-
dates of change for post-growth. However, they have not adopted post-growth yet because of 
certain gaps in bridging concepts of post-growth with their own work. To fill this gap, the study 
recommends to operationalize post-growth in five steps: (1) to distinguish between ‘sustainable 
liberalism’ and ‘fair de-growth’ as two major types of post-growth, (2) to re-frame the promises of 
economic growth as myths, (3) to complement ‘political choice’ as means towards post-growth 
with ‘social choice’, (4) to identify and compile areas of a post-growth economy, and (5) to over-
come the inherent power dilemma between agents of change and actors of these areas, that 
are required to be transformed, while forming coalitions between both. If these recommenda-
tions are taken into account by academics and activists, the environmental movement is more 
likely to successfully activate causal mechanisms of change for the transition to a post-growth 
economy. With its critique on the current comprehension of progress as economic growth, post-
growth is initiating a new, more fruitful phase of the sustainability discourse. 
Keywords: post-growth economy, ecological economics, environmental movement, agents of 
change, sustainability science
Zusammenfassung
Die Postwachstumsidee ist mit ihrer Kritik am gängigen Wachstumsgedanken ein plausibler 
Ansatz für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung, da sie eine notwendige Schärfung der regulativen 
Idee Nachhaltigkeit erlaubt. Soziale Bewegungen sind diejenigen Veränderungsakteure, die 
die Postwachstumsidee auf den Weg bringen können. Über reformistische Veränderungen hin-
aus kann es ihnen gelingen, radikale Impulse zu setzen, derer es im Sinne einer Transformation 
hin zu einer Postwachstumsökonomie bedarf. Vor diesem Hintergrund ergeben sich zwei Leit-
fragen: Welche Rolle hat die Umweltbewegung in der Debatte um eine Postwachstumsökono-
mie? Mit welchen Möglichkeiten und Hindernissen haben es die Akteure der Umweltbewegung 
zu tun, die sich der Aufgabe einer Postwachstumsökonomie annehmen wollen? 
Aus der transdisziplinären Perspektive der Nachhaltigkeitswissenschaften wurde eine qualita-
tive Studie mit Experteninterviews und Fokusgruppengesprächen durchgeführt. In aller Kürze 
zeigt das Ergebnis dieser Forschungsarbeit, dass die Umweltbewegung bislang daran scheitert, 
ihr Potential für eine Postwachstumsökonomie zu nutzen, insbesondere weil die Postwachs-
tumsansätze nicht hinreichend mit der Arbeit der Umweltbewegungsakteure verknüpft sind. 
Zunächst bedarf es deshalb einer  Konkretisierung der Postwachstumsidee und einer Verstän-
digung zwischen Umweltbewegung und Postwachstumsforscher_innen. Dieser Konkretisie-
rungs- und Verständigungsprozess hat fünf wesentliche Merkmale.
Erstens, es ist nicht notwendig, sich auf einen oder wenige Postwachstumsansätze zu konzen-
trieren, denn ihre Stärke liegt gerade in ihrer Vielfalt, mit der sie die verschiedenen relevanten 
Akteure ansprechen können. Das ergibt sich aus der Klassifizierung dieser Ansätze nach ihrer 
Haltung gegenüber der Moderne, zum Beispiel bezogen auf Werte wie Freiheit und Fortschritt. 
Das Kriterium der Moderne gilt hier als zentral für die Bewertung der Umsetzbarkeit der Post-
wachstumsansätze. Die Stärke der Postwachstumsansätze liegt darin, eine kritische Haltung 
gegenüber den Werten der Moderne einzunehmen, sie aber nicht grundlegend abzulehnen. 
Die Forschungsarbeit zeigt, dass Nachhaltigkeitsansätze, die eine kritische Haltung gegenüber 
der Moderne einnehmen, realistisch, aber auch radikal genug sind, um dem Veränderungsan-
spruch einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung gerecht zu werden. Zu den kritisch-modernen Post-
wachstumsideen zählen der Postwachstumsansatz von Meinhard Miegel, die Postwachstums-
gesellschaft von Angelika Zahrnt und Irmi Seidl sowie die Solidarische Postwachstumsökonomie 
von  Matthias Schmelzer und Alexis Passadakis. Während ersterer weniger radikal ist als letzterer, 
halten sie alle grundsätzlich am Gedanken des Fortschritts und der Freiheit fest, stellen jedoch 
die Orientierung am Wirtschaftswachstum als Weg dorthin mehr oder weniger stark in Frage. 
Zweitens werden bei einer weiteren Konkretisierung der Postwachstumsidee, die Versprechen 
wirtschaftlichen Wachstums nach Vollbeschäftigung, gesellschaftlicher Stabilität, Umwelt-
schutz, sozialer Gerechtigkeit, etc. als Mythen enttarnt. 
Drittens sind politische Instrumente wie technische Lösungen oder ökonomische Anreize bei 
den Korrekturen durch Postwachstumsansätze ebenso wichtig wie Lebensstilveränderungen 
und klare Verzichtsanstrengungen, um dem Transformationsanspruch gerecht zu werden.
Viertens, Postwachstumsaktivitäten müssen in alle relevanten gesellschaftlichen Bereiche inte-
grierbar sein. Erste Schritte sind bereits getan, um die zu transformierenden Bereiche einer 
Postwachstumsgesellschaft zu identifizieren und Vorstellungen z.B. von Arbeit, Bildung, Unter-
nehmen und Staat in einer Postwachstumsgesellschaft konzeptionell fortzuentwickeln (Zahrnt/
Seidl 2010). 
Fünftens sollten neue Koalitionen zwischen Akteuren des Wandels und Akteuren dieser zu trans-
formierenden Bereiche geschlossen werden. Anderenfalls bleibt ein Dialogvakuum zwischen 
ihnen bestehen und blockiert eine Transformation hin zu einer Postwachstumsökonomie. 
Der Wissenschaft und den sozialen Bewegungen steht in erster Linie die Aufgabe zu, diese 
 Brücken zu schlagen, um eine Postwachstumsökonomie umzusetzen. 
Schlagwörter: Postwachstumsökonomie, Ökologische Ökonomie, Umweltbewegung, Change 
Agents, Nachhaltigkeitswissenschaften
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Leaving  
Sustainability’s Cloudiness
1.1 Research problem, aim and questions
Four decades ago, “Limits to Growth” was pub-
lished by the Club of Rome in 1972. This mile-
stone of environmental history gives reason to 
be concerned as a student in sustainability sci-
ence. Ecological economists have long argued, 
economic growth is doing more harm than 
good. Distinguished academics such as Her-
man Daly (1974) came up with a plausible theo-
retical foundation for the critique on economic 
growth. In order to approach sustainability, one 
has to acknowledge, he says, that the ecological 
sphere sets the limits to the economic activities. 
Although we have known all this for a while, 
humanity is still not living within the ecologi-
cal boundaries. Ecological Economists have not 
become mainstream. Instead, the cloudy and 
ambivalent claims of the proponents of “sustain-
able development” (WCED 1987) determined 
the sustainability discourse. Sustainable devel-
opment “still leaves us largely with the same 
problems as, or worse than, at the start of the 
(…) era” (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 1745). But 
finally, sustainable development is facing strong 
opposition. Since the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, one observes a renaissance of the critique 
of economic growth (Müller 2011, 1) building on 
the thick achievements of ecological econom-
ics; a debate about a post-growth economy1 is 
emerging in several European countries such 
as France, Spain and England, in Canada and 
recently in Germany (Kerschner 2010, 544, Jack-
son 2009, Seidl/Zahrnt 2010, Victor 2008). 
This thesis starts off with two preliminary assump-
tions. First, post-growth is a plausible approach 
towards sustainability. Second, social move-
ments are major agents of change for a post-
1 In this paper, the term post-growth economy (Paech 
2009) as well as post-growth society (Seidl/Zahrnt 
2010) will be used in a broader sense than its founders 
do, if not stated differently, to indicate the overall idea 
of the new debate on growth.
growth economy and especially the environ-
mental movement can trigger a process towards 
it. Given that both statements are feasible, one 
would expect a social movement to take up the 
post-growth ideas immediately, but it does not, 
as this thesis will show. Thus, my research aim is 
to explore, in what way the fact that the German 
environmental movement did not yet adopt the 
cause of a post-growth economy requires fur-
ther operationalization of post-growth theory. 
Furthermore, the research aim is to explore, how 
the German environmental movement can acti-
vate mechanisms for realizing post-growth. The 
project focuses on Friends of the Earth Germany 
(FoE) as main agent of change for post-growth 
within the environmental movement. Hence, I 
am not seeing a shortage of understanding of 
the problem or too few concepts for sustainabil-
ity, but I largely miss the paths to get there. This 
argument is supported by Daly (2010), who says 
that “the bridge between ideas and social move-
ments is critical — hard to understand and hard 
to build”. 
The thesis research is guided by the following 
research questions: 
1. Are the German environmental movement 
and Friends of the Earth Germany, in par-
ticular, suitable candidates for establishing a 
post-growth economy? 
2. What stops Friends of the Earth Germany 
from adopting a strategy for a post-growth 
economy? 
3. How can the idea of a post-growth economy 
be operationalized for Friends of the Earth 
Germany? 
4. If post-growth was operationalized, which 
causal mechanisms could be activated by 
the environmental movement to proceed 
towards a post-growth economy?
In a nutshell, the main result of the thesis is that 
FoE lacks championing post-growth because of 
mainly five gaps in bridging the post-growth 
theory with the work of the agents of change. 
The gaps need to be filled by academia, activists 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
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and think tanks, i.e. post-growth theory needs 
further operationalization, in order for the envi-
ronmental movement to activate several mecha-
nisms of change for a post-growth economy. 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Sustainability science approach: onto­
logical and epistemological considerations
Localising this research project to the field of 
sustainability sciences, it aims to understand 
the added value of a transdisciplinary approach. 
Through the analysis of complexity, uncertainty 
and persistence, sustainability scientists have put 
one major question on their research agenda: 
“how to improve human well-being in ways that 
account for the ultimate dependence of that 
well-being on the natural environment?” (Clark 
2009, 6) The ontology of this thesis follows the 
idea of strong sustainability (Ott/Döring 2004, 
43), which considers the ecological boundaries 
as the major limiting factor for other systems. 
This idea is conceptualized in the ecological eco-
nomics model visualizing an hierarchically struc-
ture of the ecological system, the social system 
and the economic system where the former sets 
the limitations for the latter. This is an ideal and 
normative model (Ott/Döring 2004, 42), which 
runs counter with the current priorities of these 
systems and opposes the three-pillar-model of 
sustainability (Enquete-Kommission 1998, 32 as 
cited in Ott/Döring 2004, 37), which does not 
include a prioritization and separates the three 
systems from each other. The ontology of my 
thesis opposes the concept of weak sustainabil-
ity and the idea of substituting different forms of 
capital (Solow 1993). 
Besides producing knowledge, sustainability 
science has been concerned with turning the 
knowledge into action from the beginning. 
Thus, this research project applies an interdis-
ciplinary approach since it studies social move-
ments and post-growth. But it goes beyond that 
and applies a transdisciplinary approach, that 
follows Max-Neef’s comprehension of transdis-
ciplinarity (2005, 15) as “more than a new disci-
pline or super-discipline (…), actually, a different 
manner of seeing the world, more systemic and 
more holistic“. Hence, transdisciplinarity forms 
the epistemological view of this thesis. It is based 
on a societal, real-world problem and transforms 
disciplinary knowledge in order to approach this 
problem. It is not just another word for applied 
science since transdisciplinarity approaches to 
contribute to societal change. It avoids a unifica-
tion of language and methods, which would face 
the danger of applying for example methods 
of biology to a societal problem. Furthermore, 
transdisciplinarity avoids the creation of a new 
discipline, but communicates among disciplines 
and between science and practice aiming for 
more than the sum of both. However, transdisci-
plinary research “is still in the making, thus rep-
resenting an unfinished scientific programme” 
(ibid., 5). The theory-driven question of ‘what 
is to be sustained?’ gains deep relevance, if it is 
intrinsically tied to the action-oriented question 
of ‘how to get there?’. The metaphor of a bridge 
illustrates the multi-dimensional challenges a 
sustainability scientist is confronted with. First, 
the ability to bridge different types of commu-
nication is necessary, where agents lack a shared 
language. Second, bridging different norms, val-
ues and structures is required to avoid conflicts 
in goal formulation. Finally, a sustainability sci-
entist’s role to bridge theoretical and methodo-
logical spectra contributes to the connectivity of 
the results. In this thesis, the languages, values 
and structures of academics and activists have 
to be connected with each other. Further, bridg-
ing methodological and theoretical spectra is 
relevant to this thesis as well, in which political 
sciences, i.e. social movement studies, are com-
bined with economics, environmental studies 
and social sciences. 
Throughout the thesis, the reader will notice 
the inherent ontological and epistemological 
tensions of the study material. These tensions 
are due to a struggle between approaches of 
critical modernity and anti-modernity of the dif-
ferent post-growth types, which will be further 
explained in chapter 2. 
1.2.2 Research design of the exploratory study
The research is designed as a qualitative, theory-
guided study exploring a “contemporary” phe-
nomena (Yin 2003, 1). It is exploratory, because 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
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I had initial assumptions without knowing the 
outcomes of the study (Yin 2003, 15). The study 
is theory-guided, because the theoretical and 
practical results were mainly derived from the 
theoretical framework. The contemporary phe-
nomena is provided by studying FoE as a can-
didate for being an agent of change for post-
growth. Fieldwork was done at FoE’s national 
headquarters in Berlin. Choosing FoE as “unit 
of analysis” (Koopmans/Rucht 2002, 231) of the 
study is due to (1) their recent activities on post-
growth, (2) their size and potential impact and 
(3) the “insider role” (Blee/Taylor 2002, 97) I had 
during the research process due to my working 
experiences on the project “Sustainable Ger-
many in a globalized world”, a study which was 
published by FoE (BUND et al. 2008). Throughout 
the research process, my connection with FoE 
required to be transparent about my research 
intentions (i.e. sharing my research proposal 
with FoE staff). This was answered with offering 
access, for instance, to unpublished FoE docu-
ments, and trust from all involved FoE actors. 
In addition to FoE, I included the organization 
ATTAC Germany, not with the intention of doing 
a comparative study, but to back up the internal 
information by FoE agents with external reflec-
tions on FoE’s activities by other movement 
actors. 
The material for this thesis was collected in an 
“iterative process” (Blee/Taylor 2002, 110) of 
several stages of fieldwork. I triangulated (Bry-
man 2004, 275) the methods of semi-structured 
interviewing and a focus group workshop with 
desk studies on primary documents and sec-
ondary literature. To begin with, I did personal, 
informal background interviews to identify a 
sample of five key informants. I conducted quali-
tative, semi-structured interviews for one hour 
with each of the informants. The flexible inter-
view guide, either applied personally or via tele-
phone, provided rich and detailed answers (Bry-
man 2004, 320–321). Three interviewees were 
key initiators of the German post-growth debate 
either from FoE or ATTAC Germany. Four hold 
a leading position in FoE. During an advanced 
stage of research, I held a focus group work-
shop with employed experts from FoE’s national 
headquarters. While Gramson used the method 
of focus group interviewing “for studying the 
cultural outcomes of social movements, such 
as how people understand and incorporate the 
ideas, goals, practices, and identities of protest 
groups” (Gramson 1992 as interpreted by Blee/
Taylor 2002, 108), my purpose was to confront 
the eight focus group participants, who were 
explicitly not experts in post-growth, with the 
preliminary findings gained from the interviews 
to reflect not on post-growth outcomes, but on 
the integration of post-growth into the partici-
pants’ work for FoE. The focus group covers an 
interdisciplinary field of political, sociological, 
psychological, communication and natural sci-
ence perspectives. The participants have very 
different positions within the organization work-
ing with climate change, chemistry, agriculture, 
biodiversity, sustainability, youths or public rela-
tions. Although the focus group could not pro-
vide more than “fragments” (Blee/Taylor 2002, 
108), the method gave insights into the barri-
ers and opportunities of operationalizing post-
growth. A feedback interview with one of the 
formal interviewees provided further reflections 
on the focus group results (Zahrnt 2011b, inter-
view). A primary document analysis of internal 
articles, protocols and discussion papers as well 
as a literature analysis complemented the data 
collection. The main document for the primary 
document analysis is the unpublished discus-
sion paper (BUND 2011) representing the results 
of the internal discussion on post-growth within 
FoE and now is a formal foundation for the fur-
ther procedure on the issue within the organiza-
tion. 
The data was analysed by identifying common 
themes, comparing statements, identifying 
agreements and disagreements and their inter-
pretation. The themes were reciprocally gener-
ated from the theoretical framework (deduction) 
as well as from the empirical material (induction, 
both Bryman 2004, 9–10). The Appendix pro-
vides a list of interviewees. 
1.3 Limitations of the study
The decision to limit the unit of analysis to mainly 
one social movement organization reduces the 
explanatory value of the study. A comparison 
of different relevant movement organizations 
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could give a more complete answer on the 
research topic. Furthermore, with only six inter-
views on five interviewees and one focus group 
workshop, I cannot generalize the results to the 
whole organization of concern and even less 
for the environmental movement in Germany. 
The study faces the danger of being biased by 
the author’s insider role within the analyzed 
organization. I attempted to mitigate the bias by 
basing statements by FoE on secondary mate-
rial, where possible, and tried to have a critical, 
questioning attitude while collecting the mate-
rial and analyzing it. Since the material of the 
study was provided in German and needed to 
be translated, slight changes of wordings could 
not be avoided. German expressions, that do 
not exist in English, had to be further explained. 
To reduce this limitation the translated quota-
tions were reviewed by the interviewees, again. 
Due to the interdisciplinarity of this project, the 
language of this report is partly condensed and 
more addressed towards the disciplinary experts 
than towards more general sustainability scien-
tists. 
1.4 Report structure
The report unfolds its theoretical framework for 
post-growth in chapter 2 and for social move-
ments in chapter 3, where I explain the two pre-
liminary assumptions on the plausibility of post-
growth and the suitability of social movements 
as agents of change. The study’s results are pre-
sented and analyzed in chapter 4. Here, I identify 
the major gaps in bridging post-growth theory 
with the agents of change, which currently 
restrict FoE to develop a post-growth strategy 
(4.1). Furthermore, I withdraw certain recom-
mendations to dismantle these gaps (4.1.2). This 
is necessary for the environmental movement 
in Germany to activate certain mechanisms of 
change, which I analyze here (4.2), too. Chapter 
5 draws an overall conclusion and indicates sug-
gestions for further research and practice. 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework I:  
Approaching Sustainability by a 
Post-Growth Economy
The idea of a post-growth economy fundamen-
tally challenges the dominant economic para-
digm and the role of economic growth in society. 
Although it is hard to sum up what a post-growth 
economy is, at least we can say it does not imply 
to be the “exact opposite of economic growth” 
(Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 1742). The post-
growth vision is one of “an equitable and demo-
cratic transition to a smaller economy with less 
production and consumption” (Martínez-Alier et 
al. 2010, 1741). However post-growth is neither 
a concept, nor a goal in itself (Kerschner 2010, 
549). Explaining my first preliminary assump-
tion, this chapter shows how post-growth draws 
the path towards sustainability. 
2.1 A short story of modernity, the  
sustainability discourse and their  
relation to economic growth
Identifying and resolving the inherent tensions 
between economic growth, social justice and 
environmental protection, that the project of 
“sustainable development” (WCED 1987) is fac-
ing today, has been a major contribution of the 
post-growth debate (Kerschner 2010, 548). The 
post-growth idea reduces the arbitrary usage 
of the term sustainability and distinguishes 
sustainability from sustainable development. 
Post-growth economists argue that the “main 
problem with the idea of sustainable develop-
ment is not with the idea of sustainability but 
with that of development itself” (Martínez-Alier 
et al. 2010, 1743). A closer look into social theory 
will enlighten the reasons for this failure. I thus 
refer to the three attitudes of the “development 
of social theory” according to the Habermasian 
model (Callinicos 1999, 56); first, with the pur-
pose to comprehend the rise and fall of economic 
growth as the leading parameter of society (see 
section 2.1 and 2.2) and second, to understand 
the differing attitudes of post-growth agents 
towards economic growth (see section 2.3). 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
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During the emergence of the European Enlight-
enment the concept of reason became the cen-
tral claim of the modernity project. The overall 
goal of modernity and the measurement of pro-
gress has since then been to “realize individual 
freedom” (Callinicos 1999, 56). The proponents 
of uncritical modernity believe in Smith’s ‘invis-
ible hand of the market’ and business-us-usual 
scenarios to approach freedom. Differing from 
the proponents of modernity, the proponents 
of critical modernity develop a “complex aware-
ness of the tensions and dangers of modernity” 
(ibid.) and demand a radical improvement of the 
“unfinished project of modernity” (Habermas 
1997, 38). The advocates of critical modernity do 
not trust the market alone, but demand inter-
vention to regulate markets through reforms. In 
opposition of the latter, the proponents of anti-
modernity claim a “radical rejection of moder-
nity” (Callinicos 1999, 56) questioning moderni-
ty’s major concept: “Reason is nothing else than 
power, than the will to power, which it so radi-
antly conceals”, as Habermas (1987 interpreted 
by Callinicos 1999, 55) critically commented. 
Thus, the anti-modern actors go beyond free-
dom and the market searching for alternatives. 
In line with the project of modernity, freedom 
was meant to be achieved through progress. 
Later on progress was more closely understood 
as economic growth incorporated in the rise of 
the British political economy by Adam Smith 
(Victor 2008, 7). Within a couple of decades, 
(faster) economic growth became the “overarch-
ing policy objective of governments in devel-
oped countries” in the 20th century (ibid., 14). 
Economic growth became instead of a means to 
freedom an end in itself. This optimism towards 
economic growth has been carried into the 21st 
century almost unquestioned (ibid., 9). In the 
early 1970s, environmentalists — mostly non-
economists — critiqued progress as economic 
growth and followed a “claim of antagonism” 
between economic growth and environmental 
protection (Rochon 1998, 56). Among them were 
pioneers such as Meadows et al. (1972). But, with 
the rise of sustainable development, a “new era 
of economic growth” (WCED 1987, 8) emerged, 
created by a belief in the compatibility of eco-
nomic growth with environmental concerns. The 
antagonism transformed to a “search for comple-
mentarity” (Rochon 1998, 56). Traditionally, this 
is associated with the ecological modernization 
approach (Huber 1982 and Jänicke 1984 as cited 
in Andersen/Massa 2000, 338). The latest version 
of this compatibility is the “Green New Deal” that 
is incorporated in green growth strategies of the 
OECD (2010) and UNEP (2009), for instance. Loske 
(2010, 5) observes this kind of Green Keynesian-
ism2 emerging after the financial crisis in 2008. 
As a result of the dominating comprehension 
of sustainability as sustainable development — 
next to a variety of others mapped by Hopwood 
et al. (2005, 41) — 20 years after the Brundtland 
Report (WCED 1987), sustainable development 
“has been unable to produce the overarching 
policies and radical change of behaviour needed 
at individual and collective scales” (Martínez-
Alier et al. 2010, 1741). 
In sum, the compatibility of economic growth 
and environmental prosperity has been rebut 
(Hueting 2010, 528) and, thus, sustainable 
development, in particular, requires “a radical 
reconsideration” (Troccia 2009, 18), because 
sustainability, in general, “can only make sense 
if development is associated with no growth in 
the scale of the economy”, as Martínez-Alier et al. 
conclude (2010, 1743). Coming back to Haber-
mas initial model, sustainable development 
can be categorized as an uncritically modern 
approach to sustainability due to its comple-
mentarity of ecology and economy. Uncritical 
modern sustainable development is achieved 
by continuing business-as-usual promoted by 
rather conservative protagonists. This allows 
only “minimal transformations” and not the nec-
essary “radical changes” that challenge existing 
paradigms appear as a plausible comprehen-
sion of sustainability (Pissarskoi/Soete 2010, 15). 
Based on previous research at LUMES, hence, 
neither uncritically modern nor anti-modern 
2 Keynesian economics are defined as “an economic 
theory based on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes 
(1883–1946), developed in the 1930s, that assigned an 
important role to the state as well as to the private sec-
tor. Central elements of this theory are the failure of pri-
ces, especially wages, to adjust to clear markets; and the 
effect of changes in aggregate demand on real output 
and employment” (Black/Hashimzade/Myles 2009, n.p.). 
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concepts of sustainability, only critical modern 
approaches to sustainability fulfil the condition 
of the antagonism between ecology and econ-
omy (Wironen 2007, 42–43). As we will see in 
section 2.3, a critical attitude towards modernity 
is in the same way necessary for a post-growth 
economy as it is here for sustainability. 
2.2 Myths of economic growth
The recent debate on post-growth is a necessary 
revitalization of the critique of economic growth 
as an imperative condition of the economic, 
political and societal systems (Speth 2008, 68). 
In economics, “growth” is described as as growth 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). More pre-
cise, in the Oxford dictionary, economic growth 
is defined as “persistent increase in per capita 
aggregate output and in the aggregate physical 
capital per worker at a non-diminishing rate in an 
economy” (Black/Hashimzade/Myles 2009, n.p.). 
In other words, economic growth occurs, “if the 
financial value of all the exchanges of goods and 
services within it [the economy, the author] goes 
up” (Simms et al. 2010, 6). The absence of growth, 
i.e. “an overall decline in economic activity mainly 
observed as a slowdown in output and employ-
ment” (Black/Hashimzade/Myles 2009, n.p.) is 
called recession. “A prolonged period of abnor-
mally low economic activity and abnormally high 
unemployment” is called depression (both Black/
Hashimzade/Myles 2009, n.p.). Thus, a reduction 
in economic growth stands for standstill and 
instability (Müller 2011, 2). By uncovering the 
“dilemma of growth” (Jackson 2009, 7), the post-
growth agents question the wide spread thought 
that economic growth is a “panacea” (Daly 2005, 
100) and deny its initial meaning according to 
neoclassical economics, e.g. that it 
• increases wealth, i.e. available income, 
• increases employment and decreases 
unemployment, 
• reduces conflicts of distribution, 
• allows aid for developing countries, 
• reduces state debt and finances social  
security systems, and 
• increases environmental protection (all  
Lisbon Strategy of European Council 2000 as 
interpreted by Hinterberger et al. 2009, 1).
Instead of realizing the hopes to solve these 
diverse problems, economic growth even causes 
ecological problems and blocks their solution, as 
Seidl/Zahrnt (2010, 30–34) sum up their critique. 
Therefore, supporters of post-growth are moti-
vated by the ”failure of traditional economic and 
political systems and their associated ideologies 
(e.g., capitalism, socialism, social-liberalism and 
possibly sustainable development” (Martínez-
Alier et al. 2010, 1742). 
2.3 Two types of post-growth
Since post-growth is a fairly new debate, I con-
sider it as necessary to map major types of post-
growth approaches.3 Based on Martínez-Alier 
et al. (2010, 1741), type 1 represents the Eng-
lish speaking post-growth debate, while type 2 
refers to the French, Spanish and Italian post-
growth circles. For each type I found examples 
from the German post-growth debate, too.4 
2.3.1 Type 1 “sustainable liberalism”:  
where to grow?
According to post-growth type 1, called here 
“sustainable liberalism” (Zahrnt/Zahrnt 2011, 
1), the idea of a post-growth economy is to aim 
for the transformation of areas, institutions and 
structures, which depend on or support eco-
nomic growth, in the political, economic and 
societal spheres of rich, developed countries 
(Seidl/Zahrnt 2010, 18 and 34). Next to the aim 
of growth independence, which was introduced 
by Binswanger (2006) type 1 supporters ask for 
a more differentiated comprehension of eco-
nomic growth. Thus, “even in a ‘post-growth 
society’ many things still need to grow” (Speth 
2008, 16), for instance, growth would still be 
found in developing countries; people-centered 
economies; income of the poor in rich countries; 
new solution oriented industries, products and 
processes; meaningful, well-payed jobs; natural 
3 Recently, several other classifications where publishes, 
such as Demaria et al. 2011, Ott 2012 and Passadakis/ 
Schmelzer 2011b.
4 In recent publications one finds several further approa-
ches to map the new debate on growth, for example 
Demaria et al. 2011, Passadiakis/Schmelzer 2011b or 
Ott 2012.
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resource and energy productivity and invest-
ment in the regeneration of natural assets, social 
and public services (all ibid., 16). 
Sustainable liberalism sticks to the core of 
modernity and sees freedom as the highest 
good, including “economic freedom” under the 
above stated conditions of growth-independ-
ence and a differentiation in “good” and “bad” 
types of economic growth (Zahrnt/Zahrnt 2011, 
1–2). Hence, this comprehension of liberalism is 
not motivated by economic growth, regardless 
of any costs, because liberalism will not be pos-
sible on a degraded planet (ibid., 2–3). 
“The liberalism claims, that humans have to have 
the real chance to live an individual and good 
life as long as others are not restricted in their 
individuality. Where restrictions are necessary, 
they have to be just and appropriate. According 
to liberalism, nobody can expect to live a luxury 
life” (ibid., 2).
Thus, the first type of post-growth is compat-
ible with a critically modern approach to post-
growth which to some extent trust in technology 
and market forces, but with necessary correc-
tions through political choice implemented by 
bureaucrats as “juridically trained, specialized 
officials” (Habermas 1987, 308). According to 
type 1, efficiency strategies and dematerializa-
tion cannot fix the problem to a sufficient extent 
without becoming too much top-down cen-
tered (Loske 2010, 11). This means that “sustaina-
ble liberalism” follows a green Keynesianism, but 
recognizes absolute ecological limits in contrast 
to the Green New Deal Keynesianism. Typical 
advocates of this type are the think tank “Denk-
werk Zukunft” (Miegel 2010) and the scientist 
Peach (2009) on the conservative, bureaucratic 
end of the scale. With a more critical perspective 
on modernity and closer to movement circles, 
Speth (2008) and Seidl/Zahrnt (2010) can be 
found on the other, more alternative end. 
2.3.1.1 Theoretical foundations: ecological 
economics and steady-state economy
Sustainable liberalism has strong roots in the 
theory of ecological economics and Daly’s 
steady state economy (1974) as one of their 
pioneers challenging the “growth imperative” 
 (Jackson 2009, 6) with an alternative macro-
economic concept (Kerschner 2010, 544). Forty 
years ago, Boulding, Schumacher and and other 
ecological economists picked up an early and 
famous approach to overcome the imperative of 
economic growth stated by the classical econo-
mist John Stuart Mill in 1848. He supported the 
idea of a “stationary state” as a “‘normative’ (i.e. 
desirable) steady-state”, opposing Smith’s and 
Malthus’ “pessimistic vision (…) regarding sta-
tionarity” (ibid., 545). 
Daly’s concept assumes that the ecological 
system sets the boundaries for the economic 
 system. It is based on the assumption that sus-
taining natural capital means restricting eco-
nomic growth when it goes beyond the inherent 
biophysical limits (Daly 2005, 100). Following the 
“strong sustainability” approach, natural capital 
is complementary with man-made capital and 
cannot be substituted with capital produced 
by humans (ibid., 103). This stands in harsh con-
trast to the “weak sustainability” approach by 
the “orthodox, neoclassical economists” Solow 
and Stiglitz allowing the substitution between 
different forms of capital (Kerschner 2010, 546). 
Against many concerns, such a zero-growth 
economy, as suggested by Daly, does not lack 
at all in development: progress is re-defined as 
“qualitative development but not aggregate 
quantitative growth” (Daly 2008, 1). This differs 
fundamentally from Smith’s progress as eco-
nomic growth. 
“Once we pass the optimal scale, growth 
becomes stupid in the short run and impossi-
ble to maintain in the long run” leading to “an 
ecological catastrophe that would sharply lower 
living standards” (both Daly 2005, 100). There 
is evidence, that economic growth has already 
achieved the saturation limit at least in rich 
countries and now depends on political push 
effects, as Seidl/Zahrnt (2010, 33) interpret what 
Daly calls “uneconomic growth” (Daly 2005, 103). 
The concept of post-growth type 1 maintains 
that the marginal benefit above a certain level 
of income is at least not positively or even nega-
tively related to an increase in happiness (Loske 
2010, 9). 
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2.3.2 Type 2 fair de­growth: how to de­grow?
The second post-growth type, fair de-growth, 
can be defined as a socially fair decrease of pro-
duction and consumption in order to enhance 
a good life for all humans and improve locally 
and globally ecological conditions in the short 
and long run (Schneider, Sekulova and Rijnhout 
2010, 37). For Serge Latouche, who initiated the 
fair de-growth debate in 2003 in France, the aim 
of de-growth is to abandon “economic reduc-
tionism”, i.e. the “target of growth for the sake 
of growth” (both Latouche 2010, 519) and to 
“oppose the uni-dimensional man, homo eco-
nomicus” (Latouche 2010, 520). But de-growth 
is for him “not negative growth, a paradoxical 
expression and absurdity which represent the 
domination of our imagination by growth” (ibid., 
521). Fair de-growth demands instead “decolo-
nizing minds from economism” (Latouche 2006 
as quoted in Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 1744). 
This acknowledges that the “concept of growth 
is in itself vague” passing some of ambiguity on 
to the idea of de-growth as Martínez-Alier et al. 
(2010, 1746) criticize. 
The de-growth approach is based on Georgescu-
Roegen’s “categorical rejection of a steady-state 
economy” (Kerschner 2010, 544). Georgescu-Roe-
gen is considered to be the “father of de-growth” 
(Clémentin and Cheynet 2003, 11 as quoted in 
Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 1742). He ”insisted that 
only a declining state was both feasible and desir-
able” due to thermodynamic laws and the inabil-
ity of complete recycling. Even more than in type 
1, an increase in resource and energy efficiency 
is not seen as sufficient, attributed to the “Jevons 
paradox”, i.e. the rebound-effect, which compen-
sates efficiency improvements with economic 
growth through additional usage, new features, 
increase of size, etc. of products (Foster 2010, 
n.p.). Instead of finding “good” types of growth, 
such as the first type claims, fair de-growth calls 
for “voluntary simplicity” (Latouche 2006, 101 
as quoted in Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 1743) 
and “re-localise” economic activities (Latouche, 
2004, 3). In contrast of applying political instru-
ments such as type 1, typical means of type 2 are 
broad societal debates with a strong foundation 
in grassroots activities (Schneider, Sekulova and 
Rijnhout 2010, 37). In general, this post-growth 
type represents the “more radical” parts of the 
post-growth literature (Kerschner 2010, 546) and 
is expressed as a social movement rather than an 
academic discourse (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 
1743). 
Supporters of fair de-growth leave the market 
economy, according to Schneider/Sekulova/
Rijnhout (2010, 37), and some of their protago-
nists “become atheists of growth and the econ-
omy” (Latouche 2010, 522). This is where type 2 
of post-growth economy is at the edge of criti-
cal modernity and becomes partly anti-modern, 
when it rejects the concept of reason (Latouche 
2010, 521). This causes the inherent eclecticism 
of fair de-growth. Due to this inherent theoreti-
cal inconsistency, I have chosen to explain one 
relevant example for fair de-growth more in 
detail than elaborating on the theoretical foun-
dation of fair de-growth. 
2.3.2.1 A German example for fair de-growth
The approach of a “solidarity-based de-growth 
economy” is an example for fair de-growth in 
the German speaking region. The approach 
considers “freedom as solidarity” (Passadakis/
Schmelzer 2011a, 3) and was recently developed 
in the circles of ATTAC Germany, a global justice 
network (Passadakis/Schmelzer 2010a, 5). This 
variation of the second type criticises the first 
type’s social coldness and reacts with the inte-
gration of a strong thought of redistribution 
since a decrease in the use of material goods 
means even stronger social conflicts than today. 
In particular, in this example of post-growth, the 
question is not “to grow or not to grow” (Speth 
2008, 166), but the development of an alterna-
tive way of thinking about production and con-
sumption: “There is no good growth, only a good 
life!” (Passadakis/Schmelzer 2010a, 2). This exem-
plifies the anti-modern parts of fair de-growth. 
It claims a conversion of values in the sense of 
a “re-categorization” and “confrontation with 
existing ways of thinking” (Rochon 1998, 55). But 
instead of leaving the path of modernity com-
pletely, this example favours a critically modern 
attitude, too: 
“But even if we abandon growth — fare-
well, farewell! — we will continue to claim the 
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 modern concepts of human rights and democ-
racy, which have been the fruits of struggles for 
emancipation. De-growth does not mean aban-
doning the idea of the possibility for progress — 
instead it means liberating the idea of progress 
from the belief in piling up goods and economic 
growth. Thus, de-growth does not mean return-
ing to tradition, to the stone age, or giving into 
an anything-goes post-modernism.” (Passadakis/
Schmelzer 2010a, 4)
The example illustrates the eclecticism of fair de-
growth approaches between critically modern 
and anti-modern claims. 
2.4 Post-growth’s plausibility for 
approaching sustainability
Both types, sustainable liberalism and fair de-
growth, represent the diversity of the debate 
on a post-growth economy as summed up in 
Table 1. However, their weaknesses are barri-
ers for achieving a post-growth economy: fair 
de-growth tends to lack feasible means to a 
strong end, while sustainable liberalism misses 
to include a sufficient rationale for justice. 
Latouche’s fair de-growth has been criticized 
from an eco-socialist perspective for not being 
precise enough in the relationship between 
de-growth and its implications on capitalism 
(Foster 2010, n.p.) and its lacking foundation in 
economic theory (Kerschner 2010, 544). Sustain-
able liberalism, on the other hand, has been criti-
cized for being not appropriate in terms of the 
urgency and depth of the problem: Passadakis/
Schmelzer (2011a, 1) assume that Zahrnt/Zahrnt 
underestimate the consequences of having the 
real chance to live a good life. For the example 
of policy instruments, this means that the inter-
nalization of externalities will not be feasible, 
because the price for internalized goods would 
be too high to be paid under the economic 
 circumstances (Passadakis/Schmelzer 2011a, 
2). Beyond that, post-growth in general suf-
fers from the impersonality of the post-growth 
advantages, a too vague definition of a compre-
hension of progress in the sense of post-growth 
and the “the unappealing sound of ‘standstill’” 
(Kerschner 2010, 549). 
Against the apparent contradicting positions 
between the advocates of sustainable liberalism 
and fair de-growth, Martínez-Alier et al. (2010, 
1744) see them as “compatible and complemen-
tary”. In opposition, I consider critical and anti-
modern post-growth types not as compatible, 
but acknowledge their common themes. While 
the camp of sustainable liberalism certainly is 
critically modern, fair de-growth has to over-
come its eclecticism first. But instead of arguing 
about details in post-growth scenarios, we can 
take critical modern post-growth as a plausible 
point of departure to approach sustainability 
and focus on the path to achieve it, because 
next to their theoretical deficits, the ambassa-
dors of both post-growth camps lack a model of 
change, which is “convincing” or even “inspiring” 
(Loske 2010, 18). 
Sustainable Liberalism (Type 1) Fair De-growth (Type 2)
Aim Independence from economic growth, 
differentiated economic growth
‘Decolonization’ from economic 
growth, solidarity
Means/ Instruments Political choice and social choice Discursive
Theoretical Foundation Daly’s steady-state economy Georgescu-Roegen’s thermodynamic 
necessity for de-growth
Direction of Action Top-down Bottom-up
Attitude to Modernity Critically modern Critically modern and anti-modern
Table 1: Sustainable Liberalism and Fair De-growth (own figure).
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework II:  
Social Movements as Agents of 
Change for Sustainability
According to my second preliminary assump-
tion, social movements are the major agents of 
change in the post-growth project. Supported 
by a Habermasian argumentation, I explain, why 
social movements are such “key actors” (Rochon 
1998, 51) in fundamental change processes. Fur-
ther, I borrow from Kolb’s theory (2007) to explain, 
how social movements bring about change. 
While Habermas emphasizes “the agent-based 
nature”, Kolb’s approach stresses “the structural 
nature” of the change process (Avelino/Rotmans 
2009, 546). Digging deeper into the dichotomy 
of agency and structure goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis.5 Kolb’s theory intends to mitigate 
the wide spread problem of change models 
lacking a theoretical foundation, as Raskin et al. 
(2002) exemplify. 
Following della Porta/Diani (2006, 20), I define 
a social movement as “a distinct social process, 
consisting of the mechanisms through which 
actors engaged in collective action: 
• are involved in conflictual relations with 
clearly identified opponents, 
• are linked by dense informal networks, 
• share a distinct collective identity”.
Using the term “social movement organiza-
tion” (McCarthy/Zald 1977, 1212) instead of the 
broader terms of non-governmental organiza-
tion and non-profit organization, distinguishes 
it from lobby groups, political parties or religious 
associations (della Porta/Diani 2006, 26). 
Economic growth has deeply entered almost 
all societal, economic and political processes. 
This development indicates how fundamental 
the change towards a post-growth economy 
might be. Against an “accelerated version of 
gradual change” (Rochon 1998, 12) by “epistemic 
communities” (ibid., 24) or bureaucrats, inter-
5 For a discussion see Callinicos (2009)
est groups, political parties and other agents 
of  governance, who aim to achieve “innova-
tion within political institutions” (ibid., 6), a 
post-growth economy demands another type 
of change: “rapid change” (ibid., 6) is required, 
aiming for both “political and social transforma-
tion” (ibid., 8). With Avelino and Rotmans (2009, 
543) we can further define rapid change as “non- 
linear processes of social change in which a soci-
etal system is structurally transformed”. The pro-
cess of change starts by raising “a value to the 
status of controversy” (Rochon 1998, 17) and is 
only finished when new values are ”no longer a 
matter of contention, or even necessarily of con-
scious awareness” (Rochon 1998, 18). 
3.1 Resisting the “colonization” of the 
lifeworld: Habermasian argumenta-
tion for social movements as agents of 
change
In this part of my thesis I refer to previous 
research at LUMES, i.e. Trocchia’s analysis of 
Habermas’ argumentation for social movements 
as agents of change. Troccia (2009, 1) found the 
“Habermasian approach fruitful for both envi-
ronmental activists and scholars of sustainability 
science”. Habermas has developed the “Theory 
of Communicative Action” aiming: 
1. “to develop a concept of rationality that is no 
longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectiv-
istic and individualistic premises of modern 
philosophy and social theory; 
2. to construct a two-level concept of society 
that integrates the lifeworld and system par-
adigms; and, finally 
3. to sketch out, against this background, a 
critical theory of modernity which analyzes 
and accounts for its pathologies in a way that 
suggests a redirection rather than an aban-
donment of the project of the enlighten-
ment” (McCarthy 1984, vi in Habermas 1984).
Habermas distinguishes between “instrumental 
reason” (Habermas 1987, 333) and “communi-
cative rationality” (Habermas 1984, 390), which 
results in two spheres of society: system and 
lifeword, as illustrated in figure 1. The distinc-
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tion leads over to Habermas problem percep-
tion, in which the system “colonizes” the life-
world (Habermas 1987, 355). The colonization 
happens through an exchange between the 
private and public sphere and between the eco-
nomic and the state spheres through the media 
of money and power (Habermas 1981, 36). This 
colonization is expressed by a decline of the 
public sphere, e.g. by citizens who are reduced 
to passive consumers and by the dominance of 
private concerns over common good and demo-
cratic concerns (Kellner 2000, 264 as interpreted 
by Trocchia 2009, 15). This conflict “at the seam 
between system and lifeworld” (Habermas 1981, 
36) is of particular interest in this thesis, because 
this is were new social movements, such as 
the environmental, the feminist and the peace 
movements occur. They are unified by the cri-
tique of economic growth (ibid., 34) expressed 
“as resistance to tendencies to colonize the life-
world” (ibid., 35). The resistance incorporates that 
“the public sphere (lifeworld) must be radical-
ized so as to decolonize itself (awake the ‘sleep-
ing gallery’) from the dominance of the system 
media (money, power), which threaten its inde-
pendence and vitality” (Wironen 2007, 37). The 
process of resisting the colonization “cannot be 
reduced only to formal mechanisms of participa-
tion, e.g. party politics and voting”, but needs to 
be complemented by informal mechanisms acti-
vated by new social movements as “fundamen-
tal actors of political change” (Trocchia 2009, 22). 
The role of new social movements can be speci-
fied as “fostering (…) the process of opinion- 
and will-formation in the informal civil society” 
(ibid., 22). In contrast to new social movements, 
old social movements are organized around the 
conflict between capital and labour (ibid., 20). 
With Trocchia’s interpretation of Habermas’ criti-
cally modern theory, we can identify new social 
movements6 as main agents of change “creating 
an autonomous public sphere” (Trocchia 2009, 
33) by means of collective action. 
6 In the following, I will refer to ‘new social movements’ 
as ‘social movements’.
3.2 Kolb’s framework of modelling 
change by social movements
The thesis is using Kolb’s “Partial Theory of Social 
Movements” (2007, 19), in which he explores 
a model for successful change through social 
movements. With his theory, Kolb recognizes 
and approaches a deficit of movement research 
by theorizing causal mechanisms of social 
movements in order to comprehend their politi-
cal outcomes. Focusing on a social movement’s 
mechanisms allows to strengthen the move-
ment’s capacity for transformational change in 
terms of contributing to a post-growth econ-
omy. The overview of this theory given here will 
be complemented throughout the analysis part 
(chapter 4), but still requires the lecture of the 
book to fully grasp the complexity and ingenuity 
of Kolb’s theory. 
His basic assumption is that “in order to achieve 
their political ends, social movements must 
activate one or several of five different causal 
mechanisms of political change” (Kolb 2007, 
274). The concept of causal mechanisms of polit-
ical change “should help us to understand why, 
under certain political conditions, mobilization 
and the use of specific movement tactics are 
likely to cause political change” (ibid., 72). Those 
five mechanisms are the disruptive mechanism, 
the public preference mechanism, the political 
access mechanism, the judicial mechanism and 
the international politics mechanism (ibid., 73). 
With the concept of causal mechanisms Kolb 
builds on an argument developed by McAdam/
Tarrow/Tilly (2001, 70) of the non-linear, indi-
rect dynamics in movements incorporated in 
the concept of “trajectories of contention”. A 
successful activation of the causal mechanisms 
depends on (a) the strength of the movement, 
(b) its strategy (use of certain tactics to pursue 
specific political goals) and (c) on the cultural, 
the economic and particularly the political con-
text, and these three internal or external condi-
tions result either in opportunities or constraints 
(Kolb 2007,  274–275). Kolb defines a social 
movement’s political ends as outcomes, con-
sequences or impacts and avoids speaking of 
success and failure, since those terms are less 
neutral and more vague than the former (ibid., 
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22). Critically, Giugni (1998, 383) adds to this 
that despite the fact that “social movements are 
rational efforts to bring about change, many of 
their consequences are unintended and often 
unrelated to their claims”. 
One has to consider that the concept of strat-
egy as well as its relation to outcomes “is one of 
the most under-theorized topics in social move-
ment theory” (Kolb 2007, 45, who is supported 
by Ganz 2000, 1008 and 1009). Nevertheless, 
Raschke/Tils (2007, 127) define political strategy 
as success-oriented construct based on goal-
means-environment calculations. They draw the 
“picture of a hierarchical structured collective 
actor”, as Stöss (2008, 26) criticizes. This picture 
seems not to fit with social movement reali-
ties. Apparently there is a difference in strategic 
understanding: 
”because social movements are dynamic, par-
ticipatory, and organized primarily to celebrate 
collective identity and assert public voice, their 
structures of participation, decision making, and 
accountability are more like those of other civic 
associations that celebrate collective identity 
(churches, for example) or assert public voice 
(advocacy groups) than of those that produce 
goods or services.” (Ganz 2008, 2)
The differentiation correlates with Troccia’s inter-
pretation of Habermas, that a strategy “can be an 
effective and justifiable means to resist coloniza-
tion”, if it “rel[ies] on dialogue as medium of per-
suasion” (Troccia 2009, 32). Under the condition 
of an ideal consensus as a feature of commu-
nicative rationality (Troccia 2009, 32) the term 
strategy is not contradicting with Habermas’ 
request for communicative action. Here, I dif-
fer from a largely used concept of strategy (see 
for example Raschke/Tils 2007) that is defined 
by the feature of instrumental rationality (Troc-
cia 2009, 32). Additionally, the concept of causal 
mechanisms acknowledges the limitations of 
the concept of strategy and the limitations of 
reconstructing the causality between the social 
movements and the political response (Kolb 
2007, 23). In particular it acknowledges that 
tracing successful outcomes back to one single 
organization is “virtually impossible” (Kolb 2007, 
24) partly because movements are “not homo-
geneous entities, but a variety of organizations” 
(Giugni 1999, xx as quoted in Kolb 2007, 24). The 
“time-lag between the mobilization of a social 
movement and the occurrence of such political 
outcomes” (Kolb 2007, 22) further limits the cau-
sality. 
Three considerations limit the application of 
Kolb’s approach in this thesis or require to go 
beyond it: 
1. Instead of looking retrospectively at a move-
ment (in Kolb’s case the US-American civil 
rights movement and the anti-nuclear move-
ment), I am analysing a movement that does 
barely exist yet — a potential post-growth 
movement. Hence, there are no outcomes to 
be analysed at present. Instead, I apply the 
post-growth theory to Kolb’s explanatory 
theory with focus on the three conditions, 
on which the activation of the mechanisms 
depends. His theory has not been applied by 
other scholars yet. 
2. Instead of looking at a whole movement, the 
scope of this thesis and the limited expan-
sion of the objective allow only to analyze 
one social movement organisation as part of 
a potential post-growth movement. I choose 
the environmental movement organization 
FoE and its strategy. In contrast of Kolb’s 
approach, I apply a “combined approach” of 
social movement studies and organization 
analysis, as suggested by Davis/Zald (2005, 
350), facing the danger of losing the dynamic 
of Kolb’s model and falling back into a static 
analysis looking at only one organization 
(Tilly 2000, 15). 
3. In terms of outcomes, Kolb focuses on the 
political ones. The post-growth project, 
however, will have cultural outcomes, as 
Giugni (1998, 388) suggests to look at, and 
economic outcomes, so that I judge it nec-
essary to include a broader understanding 
of outcomes. This requires to develop addi-
tional mechanisms of economic and cultural 
change, but such an extension of Kolb’s the-
oretical framework goes beyond the scope 
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of my thesis. Consequently, I assume, that 
focusing on mechanisms of political change 
offers not a complete, but a sufficient frame-
work for my analysis.
3.3 Model of change: collective agency 
for structural change
Generally speaking, social movements remove 
structural barriers of change. This function dis-
tinguishes a social movement, for instance, from 
critical consumers, whose ability for structural 
changes is limited since they focus on their pri-
vate sphere. Additionally, structural changes 
realized by social movement can affect other 
change agents and improve their potential 
for change. One has to consider, however, that 
agents of change face a dilemma between illu-
sion and euphoria of managing change (Kristof 
2010, 21). Figure 1 illustrates the model of struc-
tural change driven by collective agency as it 
was developed throughout this chapter. 
Figure 1: Social Movements as Agents of Change in a Habermasian Model of Communicative Action  
(Source: Conducted by the author from Habermas 1984 and 1987, Kolb 2007 and Troccia 2009). 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Analysis:  
Towards the Environmental Move-
ment’s Adoption of Post-Growth
This chapter presents and analyzes the results 
of my study, in which I was interviewing five key 
informants, was holding a focus group workshop 
with eight participants (Focus group 2011) and 
did a primary document analysis (BUND 2011). 
Here, I apply Kolb’s theory of social movements 
to the German environmental movement and, in 
particular, FoE to comprehend their opportuni-
ties and constraints for adopting post-growth.
I come up with four main findings: first, the study 
showed that a German post-growth movement 
is not to be expected, but can be compensated 
by the environmental movement and FoE’s 
qualification for post-growth (section 4.1.1). 
Second, it showed that FoE lacks championing 
post-growth because of a gap in bridging post-
growth theory with its own work (section 4.1.2). 
The gap can be filled through operationalizing 
post-growth. Therefore, I suggest five recom-
mendations to the major gaps (section 4.1.2). 
Third, the study showed also, that the politi-
cal, economic and cultural context in Germany 
largely inhibits proceeding towards a post-
growth economy, nevertheless some promising 
opportunities could be identified (section 4.1.3). 
Last but not least, the study found that the envi-
ronmental movement in Germany can activate 
certain mechanisms of change, if post-growth 
can be operationalized (section 4.2). 
4.1 Conditions of change for a post-
growth economy: opportunities and 
constraints
In this section I refer to the three conditions Kolb 
(2007, 274–275) developed in his theory: move-
ment agents, strategy and context. 
4.1.1 Movement agency: From multiple identi­
ties to a post­growth movement?
This part is looking for particular social move-
ments and parts of them as agents of change 
towards a post-growth economy. This follows 
from my research question 1, which is asking, if 
the German environmental movement and FoE 
are suitable candidates for a post-growth econ-
omy? For now we just look at the movement itself 
and assume that “movements can impact policy 
making with their own forces, without external 
support”, which is expressed in the “direct-effect 
model” (both Kolb 2007, 39). We will see later on, 
that this link is “incomplete” (ibid., 43). 
The “concept of collective action”, which deter-
mines the analysis of a potential post-growth 
movement in Germany, recognizes that it would 
not be rational for individual actors to support 
the production of collective goods, as central to 
post-growth, “if they had to bear all the costs of 
failure, but could enjoy all the fruits of success 
without having contributed directly to the pro-
duction of the good” (della Porta/Diani 2006, 
101). The problem with post-growth though is, 
that it has no immediate beneficiaries. Those 
who benefit from it — the same as for most sus-
tainability conflicts — are nature, today’s poor 
and future generations. Thus, the post-growth 
project requires collective advocates among 
today’s generation, including today’s poor. One 
can derive from the post-growth typology, that 
both types are compatible with social move-
ments as collective agents of change. Fair de-
growth and sustainable liberalism do not believe 
in bureaucrats (alone) fixing the problem. 
4.1.1.1 Desperately seeking a German post-
growth movement
In Germany, unlike other European countries 
such as France, Spain and Italy (Kerschner 2010, 
544), we currently see the development of a criti-
cal community, but not a post-growth move-
ment. “Critical communities” refer to a concept 
that frames “the originators of new values per-
spectives” (Rochon 1998, 22). Neither do these 
critical thinkers “necessarily belong to a formally 
constituted organization” (ibid., 22), nor do they 
“seek specific outcomes so much as they attempt 
to influence the conceptual framework” (ibid., 
23). Among the critical post-growth communi-
ties in Germany, we find “substantial differences” 
(ibid., 23), which are typical within critical com-
munities. Four major sources of dissent were 
identified and can also be found in Germany: 
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(1) post-growth agents, who oppose economic 
growth and those who develop alternatives, (2) 
those agents who focus on global approaches 
versus those focusing on local approaches, (3) 
those, who demand fundamental institutional 
changes and those who are fine with minor 
adaptations of institutional structures, and (4) 
those agents, who prefer a theoretical analysis 
versus those who prefer grassroots and policy 
strategies (Schneider/Sekulova/Rijnhout 2010, 
38). These variations occur within and between 
organizations, groups and among individuals 
(della Porta/Diani 2006, 99). The “heterogene-
ity” (Zahrnt 2011a, interview) of post-growth 
communities result in “multiple identities” with 
strong “tensions among various types of iden-
tification” (both della Porta/Diani 2006, 98). The 
question is now, if the critical post-growth com-
munities turn into a social movement “as the 
source of pressure that brings these ideas to 
the attention of social and political institutions” 
(Rochon 1998, 22)? 
Despite the fact that a movement ”does not 
always presuppose a strong ‘collective we’” (della 
Porta/Diani 2006, 98), the interviewees agreed 
on the claim, that currently we do not have a 
post-growth movement in Germany due to the 
observed heterogeneity (Zahrnt 2011a, inter-
view, Schmelzer 2011, interview). Although 
“conflictual relations” between growth-support-
ing and growth-opposing agents are given, the 
post-growth activities in Germany can not be 
called a “distinct, social process” of “dense infor-
mal networks”, according to the definition of 
social movements (della Porta/Diani 2006, 20). 
But while Schmelzer (2011, interview) sees rea-
son to develop post-growth as a crucial issue in 
social movements in Germany, Zahrnt (2011a, 
interview) opposes this. Enhancing a German 
post-growth movement would risk losing the 
currently heterogeneous agents, in particular 
the more conservative ones, in favor of “building 
an interesting movement of a relatively homo-
geneous political spectrum” (Zahrnt 2011a, 
interview). A post-growth movement faces the 
danger of only representing a niche of views, 
while a post-growth economy requires “a broad 
majority for change” (Zahrnt 2011a, interview). 
In sum, the heterogeneity of the agents is a bar-
rier for the development of a post-growth move-
ment in Germany, but a the same time a chance 
for a broad debate on the issue. 
4.1.1.2 Post-growth related movements
Although in Germany the emergence of a post-
growth movement is unlikely, “the critique of 
economic growth is placed in other existing 
movements” (Zahrnt 2011a, interview). Post-
growth related movements, which carry out 
parts of the ideas of a post-growth economy, are, 
for instance, the long existing and growing soli-
darity economy initiatives, the non-commercial 
agriculture movement, the eco-village move-
ment, the anti-globalization movement and the 
more recent slow food movement (Focus group 
2011). Particularly often drawn is the relation 
to the transition town initiatives (Jackson 2009, 
105). The movement’s founder refuses a direct 
critique of economic growth, but sees the end of 
economic growth as inevitable due to the end of 
fossil fuels (Hopkins 2011, interview). 
Theses critiques of the contemporary economic 
system lack an obvious claim of post-growth 
and differ from the “‘partisans’ of de-growth or 
the ‘objectors to growth’” themselves (Latouche 
2010, 521). The post-growth related movements 
“do not have their origins in the critique on 
growth” and do not prioritize to replace growth 
(Zahrnt 2011a, interview). The workshop par-
ticipants (Focus group 2011) support Zahrnt’s 
critical appraisal that these related movements 
do not attempt to change politics on a national 
level, which is required for a post-growth econ-
omy. Since they are “too specific” and “narrow” 
to promote the entire concept of post-growth, 
related movements are “not expected to become 
the engines” of a post-growth economy, but 
certainly they are “practical examples” of post-
growth communities since they are better estab-
lished and developed than the German post-
growth communities (Zahrnt 2011b, interview). 
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4.1.1.3 The German environmental move-
ment and FoE as post-growth agency
An adequate social movement agency can be 
found among already existing movements, 
which are qualified, i.e. well-established and 
broad enough, to carry the idea of a post-
growth economy. In particular, the environmen-
tal movement fulfils these criteria and is likely to 
be a driver (Speth 2008, 315, 337): its broad inte-
gration in society and its expertise grown over 
decades explains its general function for post-
growth (Zahrnt 2011a, interview, Zahrnt 2011b, 
interview). Essential for contributing to a post-
growth economy is the fact that it “includes social 
justice as well as environmental concerns” since 
less used material goods can exacerbate con-
flicts of distribution (Speth 2008, 338). For a long 
time, the German environmental movement has 
integrated sustainability’s major thought of con-
ceptualizing together the social and ecological 
question on different political levels, which now 
becomes central to post-growth. Two examples 
for this argument are the studies “Sustainable 
Germany” (BUND/Miserior 1996) and “Sustain-
able Germany in a globalized world” (BUND et al. 
2008), mainly initiated by FoE. 
Next to other major environmental movement 
organizations such as German League for Nature 
Conservation and Environmental Protection 
(DNR), Nature and Biodiversity Conservation 
Union (NABU) and Greenpeace, FoE has been 
contributing for at least two decades to the 
establishment of the environmental movement 
in the sustainability discourse. The organization 
goes beyond nature conservation approaches 
and is “giving environmental concerns a soci-
etal frame”, too (Spangenberg 2011, interview). 
Already in the early 1980s, FoE published a 
book on employment without environmental 
damage (original title: Arbeit ohne Unweltzer-
störung, Binswanger/Frisch/Nutzinger 1983) 
and developed positions on the critique of GDP, 
the ecological tax reform and an ecological-
social market economy (BUND 2011, 1). Accord-
ing to their guiding principles, the organization 
aims for the following: “We are an association 
for environmental protection and nature con-
servation aimed at bringing about sustainable 
development on a local, regional, national and 
international level” (BUND 2004, 1). With 480,000 
members, FoE is itself broadly established in 
the societal mainstream and seen by a major-
ity of Germans “as legitimized organ of their 
interests” (Spangenberg 2011, interview). Due 
to their character as a large, pluralistic “mass 
protest organization”, they combine “participa-
tory democracy” with formal policy work (both 
della Porta/Diani 2006, 147). Additionally, Zah-
rnt (2011a, interview) is expressing FoE’s strong 
motivation for post-growth: “FoE has the best 
conditions among the environmental move-
ment organizations to become not only a sus-
tainability organization, but also a post-growth 
organization.” 
4.1.2 Movement organization strategy:  
operationalizing post­growth 
This part analyzes the strategy of the social 
movement organization FoE based on research 
question 2 and 3: what stops FoE from adopting 
a strategy for a post-growth economy and how 
can the idea of a post-growth economy be oper-
ationalized for FoE? To fulfil Kolb’s second condi-
tion, FoE is required to develop a strategy as the 
way the organization “pursues its political goals 
with certain tactics” (Kolb 2007, 45–46). The fol-
lowing analysis explains that the reason for FoE’s 
restrain in championing post-growth is neither 
their inability to deal with large-scale issues, nor 
a deficit in academic concepts of post-growth, 
but a missing bridge between post-growth 
theory and FoE’s work. FoE is restricted because 
of these gaps, but does not cause them itself. 
Certainly, FoE is not the only post-growth agent 
with “contradicting arguments” (Schmelzer 2011, 
interview). 
The study found, firstly, that these gaps in the 
strategy need to be filled to be able to activate 
causal mechanisms of change and implement 
post-growth by social movement organizations. 
This is why I state in this section five recom-
mendations for the operationalization of post-
growth. I address them to those actors who are 
concerned with a consistent theoretical frame-
work for post-growth, i.e. to academia, to FoE 
and a few other actors, as will be clarified below. 
The academic findings on post-growth need to 
be popularized and translated for social move-
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ment organizations in order to have an impact 
for a post-growth economy. Vice versa, social 
movements and their organizations need to 
address their challenges towards academia. 
But even if FoE had a consistent strategy on post-
growth, the organization would still face a tripled 
organizational dilemma between mobilizing 
people or resources, hierarchical or horizontal 
structures, and being challengers or “service pro-
viders”, as the study found secondly (della Porta/
Diani 2006, 141–143). Where post-growth claims 
do not correlate with the motives of voluntary 
engagement, interest of media audience and 
donators, it is likely that the latter will get priority 
(Franck 2011, interview). This dilemma indicates 
a “democratic ambivalence” (Raschke/Tils 2007, 
42) between democratic processes and power 
structures in social movements (Stöss 2008, 26). 
Due to this “dual nature of movements” (Rochon 
1998, 53), we can state a “strategic paradoxon” 
for the key agent of change, FoE (Machnig 2008, 
37). This fundamental limitation of a movement 
organization strategy causes the necessity for 
activating broader mechanisms by the agents of 
change (see section 4.2). 
4.1.2.1 Missing bridge I:  
vague post-growth goals
Goal 1: Due to FoE’s recent forswearing of eco-
nomic growth, which has not been expressed as 
obvious in the past as now, the organization is 
part of the post-growth debate: FoE formulates 
a “strong critique of the Green New Deal” and 
distances itself from those representatives of 
the environmental movement, who believe in 
“sustainable growth” (both BUND 2011, 22). In its 
recent discussion, FoE goes beyond the critique 
of economic growth and criticizes the “grow-
ing economic logic of life”, indicated by viewing 
things as products and by the dominance of the 
ownership concept (ibid., 23). The suggested 
alternative is a “sufficient, resource-light life-
style, which implicates no decrease in life qual-
ity, but — if material conditions and a change 
in thinking happened — allows the increase of 
happiness” (ibid., 23) and adds a strong positive 
notion to economic de-growth to overcome the 
danger of “standstill” (ibid., 34). However, Zahrnt 
(2011b, interview) clearly states, that “it is nec-
essary to inform about the fact that people will 
have less money and can spend less on material 
goods than now”. Thus, the “liberation from eco-
nomic growth” is the main goal of the strategy 
(Metzges 2010, 3). 
Recommendation 1: Re-framing the promises 
of economic growth as myths. Post-growth 
arguments need to be clearly distinguished 
from those of ecological modernization and 
sustain able development (Hueting 2010, 529). 
Therefore, ecological economics offer a macro-
economic model for a post-growth economy. 
When post-growth actors systematical re-frame 
the promises of economic growth as myths 
accessible for all societal milieus, as its main con-
tribution, they can mark the beginning of a new 
phase of the sustainability discourse. 
Goal 2: FoE strives for freedom and welfare in 
the Global North and South, and follows the ide-
als of the “market economy” and “democracy” 
(BUND 2011, 34, 35), but recognizes that “eco-
nomic growth is not the ideal path to get there” 
(ibid., 21). Thus, FoE does not view development 
as economic growth. A newspaper article by 
Zahrnt/Zahrnt (2011, 1) indicates the awareness 
of single movement actors about the different 
moments of modernity. Zahrnt, as a key actor in 
FoE, locates herself within the article in “sustain-
able liberalism” (ibid.). In sum, FoE’s position is 
less radical than post-growth type 2 and is not 
judged as anti-modern, but critically modern. 
Recommendation 2: Locating post-growth as 
critical modern. The previous analysis on sus-
tainability (see chapter 2.1) showed that only 
critically modern post-growth approaches are 
compatible with sustainability, as it is under-
stood in this thesis; neither uncritical, nor anti-
modern approaches of post-growth are suitable. 
There is an academic need to clearly position 
post-growth goals within one of the three atti-
tudes of modernity and narrow down the con-
cepts of progress and development for post-
growth, as exemplified for the case of property 
(van Griethuysen 2010, 594). To overcome the 
existing eclecticism within post-growth type 
2 and, hence, between the two types leav-
ing “Georgescu-Roegen’s growthmania and 
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Latouche’s tyranny of growth” (Kerschner 2010, 
549) is required. 
4.1.2.2 Missing bridge II:  
vague post-growth tactics
Tactic 1: The workshop participants raised ques-
tions regarding the means of addressing “une-
conomic growth” (Daly 2005, 103) adequately 
(Focus group 2011). The study identified effi-
ciency as one contradictorily framed means 
in FoE’s position. On the one hand, efficiency 
strategies are seen as an “indispensable part of 
a modern sustainability strategy” (BUND 2011, 
18), as indicated by FoE’s engagement in energy 
efficiency campaigns (ibid., 17). Whereas, on the 
other hand, FoE states that “even an efficiency 
revolution is not enough” (ibid. 17), when con-
sidering that “only efficiency rates that are higher 
than the rate of economic growth have positive 
effects on the environment” (ibid., 17). For FoE 
efficiency is even positively correlated with eco-
nomic growth (ibid. 18). 
Recommendation 3: Going beyond  political 
choice as means towards post-growth. Effi-
ciency and decoupling are critically discussed 
instruments of political choice (Alcott 2010, 
558–559). Favored among post-growth type 
1 advocates are, instead, the development of 
a commons sector, the ecological tax reform, 
greenhouse gas or land trade permissions, a 
reform of national accounts, a reform of the bank 
and financial system, the limitation of advertise-
ment and the shortage of the working day, week 
and year (CASSE 2011a, n.p.). A few of these have 
been implemented in Germany, but with only 
minor positive effects. Increasingly, these instru-
ments developed by academics such as Daly, 
Jackson, Speth and Korten (CASSE 2011a, n.p.) 
are translated into practical policies by think 
tanks such as CASSE (2011a) or FöS (2011), for 
instance. Nevertheless, their hesitant realization 
raises the question, if political instruments suf-
ficiently address the problem of uneconomic 
growth or not. If not, what would be the alter-
native means? The further procedure of going 
beyond political choice depends on the under-
lying post-growth type: according to critically 
modern “sustainable liberalism”, against the 
decline of values in the current system of uncriti-
cal modernity, values need to be restored for 
post-growth, in order to finish the project of 
modernity (Habermas 1997, 38). In line with Sen 
(1999), one main value, development, is under-
stood as “freedom” and social choice would then 
be the mean to achieve it. The concept of social 
choice (Sen 1999, 76–81, Habermas 1987, 100, 
Habermas 1984, 286–287), understood as par-
ticipatory and inter-subjectively agreed social 
capabilities, can complement political choice. 
Here, a broader understanding of Daly’s steady-
state economy is needed going beyond strong 
sustainability in the classical, rather economic 
sense. 
Meanwhile, fair de-growth advocates, such as 
Latouche (2004), do not believe in any form of 
economic growth and see modernity itself as the 
problem. The approach of those anti-modern 
actors would be a discursive change of culture, 
in which values such as regionalism or solidarity 
would be defined (Shiva 2009, Passadakis/Schm-
elzer 2011a, 1). Thus, the means advocated by 
type 2 are more radical in going beyond the con-
cept of political choice. Such means face prob-
lems associated with leaving the market system 
without offering a plausible alternative. 
Tactic 2: The study could prove, that economic 
growth as well as post-growth are “too abstract” 
to justify to be translated into a campaign (Zah-
rnt 2011a, interview, also Spangenberg 2011, 
interview). Growth as well as post-growth lack 
the participatory character, that is essential for 
campaigning, “offered through such political 
institutions and processes as elections, refer-
enda, legislative and regulatory gearings, and 
informal negotiations with governmental offi-
cials” (Rochon 1998, 209). “Whereas it is hardly 
possible to organize campaigns against growth, 
it is well possible to do (and it is done) on various 
aspects of growth politics” (Spangenberg 2011, 
interview). Thus, it is important to distinguish 
between “growth as an abstract concept and 
growth politics as a series of projects and deci-
sions to promote growth” (Spangenberg 2011, 
interview). Today, “most of FoE’s projects run 
indirectly against growth politics”, although they 
are not explicit about it (Spangenberg 2011, 
interview). A holistic post-growth approach is 
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a  “challenge” for the organization, and this sug-
gests to focus on a few major topics of post-
growth, that are already part of FoE’s broad 
engagement (Zahrnt 2011a, interview). As one 
communicative tool, a “happiness calculator” 
similar to the existing ecological footprint calcu-
lator has been suggested by the workshop par-
ticipants (Focus group 2011). 
Recommendation 4: Identifying and com-
piling post-growth areas. As a result of FoE’s 
request for viewing post-growth as an integral 
topic, the core areas of a post-growth economy 
have to be defined. In particular, this has been 
done by Seidl/Zahrnt (2010) for the following 
areas: pension system, health system, education, 
labor market, consumption, redistribution and 
social justice, resource efficiency, companies, 
financial markets and bank system, tax policy, 
state finances as well as democracy, citizenship 
and participation (see for further details Appen-
dix B). The next step is now to develop and narrow 
down these areas for the organization’s depart-
ments, projects and positions. Once the depend-
encies of economic growth in current FoE pro-
jects are analyzed, their potential for including 
post-growth messages offering new approaches 
to go beyond just criticizing economic growth 
need to be examined. How can an environmen-
tal organization such as FoE contribute to a post-
growth health system? Which department in FoE 
would be responsible for post-growth compa-
nies? The study shows that the core themes of 
post-growth can be integrated into FoE’s depart-
ments, such as biodiversity, climate change and 
energy politics, nature conservation, agriculture 
and mobility. Post-growth think tanks such as 
CASSE/EJfA (2010), the Post-Growth Institute 
(2011) and Denkwerk Zukunft (2011) could fill 
this gap through close cooperation between 
academia and social movement organizations. 
Partially, they are working already on the areas 
(CASSE 2011b), but the bridge to social move-
ment organizations is still missing. Think tanks 
could also develop personalized versions of 
alternative indicators of prosperity (see section 
4.1.3) to operationalize the idea of a “happiness 
indicator” for FoE. 
Tactic 3: Establishing a coalition with unions was 
recommended several times (Schmelzer 2011, 
interview, Zahrnt 2011a, interview, Focus group 
2011). Unions have a potential “key role” in the 
debate, although “they will not be a driver for 
of a post-growth movement” (Schmelzer 2011, 
interview). Until now, the debate develops “inde-
pendently from unions” (Schmelzer 2011, inter-
view). The study provides reason for a strong 
skeptical attitude of the post-growth commu-
nity towards unions: they are seen as one major 
driver for the system obsessed with economic 
growth (Schmelzer 2011, interview, Focus group 
2011), although unions have promoted the idea 
of shorter working weeks and the redistribu-
tion of work hours in the 1990s (Müller 2011, 2). 
Unless they are not convinced, it will be unlikely 
to establish an alternative model for labor work 
with reduced working hours and the revalua-
tion of other forms of work: care work, house-
hold work, social and community engagement. 
The re-integration of old social movements such 
as the labor movement and, in particular, labor 
unions play a significant role in the post-growth 
project, despite the fact that their motivation for 
resistance differs from new social movements, as 
Habermas showed earlier. The plausibility of the 
re-integration of old and new social movements 
in a post-growth movement strategy has to be 
tested by social movement scientists (Kriesi et al. 
1995, 80–81). 
Recommendation 5: Forming coalitions with 
actors of post-growth areas. In general, a 
post-growth strategy has to overcome the moti-
vational dilemma that currently blocks the for-
mation of coalitions between FoE and actors of 
post-growth areas. The study found that “mostly 
environmentalists, but not those experts of core 
post-growth themes” are concerned with post-
growth (Zahrnt 2011a, interview). But FoE and 
the environmental movement alone, do not 
have the power and connections to drive this 
change alone. Instead those experts from the 
post-growth areas have the ability and influ-
ence to develop and implement post-growth. 
They can take responsibility for the deficits of 
their approaches and change or even replace 
them with alternatives. Subsequently, the envi-
ronmental movement in Germany and FoE, in 
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particular, require a coalition with actors from 
post-growth areas, who are currently drivers 
of economic growth, but essential for a post-
growth economy. These actors have to be iden-
tified and involved. Forming coalitions would 
be important for both types of post-growth, 
although it was easier for those who are closer to 
the conservative fraction of type 1 than for the 
radical fraction of type 2 since the connectivity is 
more likely in the first case. Through “the support 
of leading social institutions and actors, and on 
access to the mass media” (Rochon 1998, 210), 
FoE can “create and make visible widespread 
social concern about a general issue area” (ibid., 
210). Here, the most effort needs to be invested 
by social movements, in particular, by the identi-
fied candidate FoE. 
To proceed from here, I assume that these gaps 
can be filled in the future by social movement 
organizations, academia, think tanks and other 
bridging actors. 
4.1.3 Movement’s environment:  
political, economic and cultural context for 
post­growth in Germany
Regarding the growing number of newspaper 
articles, scientific conferences and governmen-
tal commissions on post-growth, one could 
question whether initiating a societal debate 
on post-growth is “overdue” as the head of FoE 
wrote recently (Weiger 2010, n.p.). Actually, it 
is “already ongoing” (Spangenberg 2011, inter-
view). There are even “signals for a decline in the 
debate”, as the sociologist Schor (interpreted 
by Zahrnt 2011a, interview) assumes. Indeed, 
next to the movement itself, the external “ever-
changing” environment (Ganz 2000, 1011)7 inter-
acts with the movement. Thus, it either blocks or 
supports the activation of mechanisms towards 
a post-growth economy by the German envi-
ronmental movement and is necessary to be 
analyzed before answering research question 
four in chapter 4.2. The assumption is based on 
the “joint-effect model” and the “indirect-effect 
model” (Kolb 2007, 52–53), which refuse a linear 
7 The categories describing the external opportunities 
and constraints, which are structuring the analysis, are 
taken from Kolb’s model (2007, 53–70)
influence of the movement towards its political 
outcomes. 
The major barrier is the lack of challenging the 
consensus of economic growth among political 
elites in Germany and therewith, the absence of 
an elite conflict about post-growth. Other con-
straints in the political, economic and cultural 
context are the following: 
• The partisanship through the German gov-
ernment is missing. Instead, it celebrates eco-
nomic growth as panacea in their initial dec-
laration: “Creating growth is the aim of our 
government. (…) Without growth no invest-
ment, without growth no employment, with-
out growth no money for education, without 
growth no aid for the poor. However, growth 
creates investment, employment, money 
for education, aid for the poor and — most 
important — trust of the people.” (Merkel 
2009, n.p.). 
• GDP as a foundation for most policy deci-
sions beyond its original conceptualization 
is dominating; also, broadly establishing the 
critique of GDP, meaning that GDP calcula-
tions are reductionist in the sense that they 
under-price natural capital and are blind 
to social capital, struggles (Johnson 2010, 
26–27, Liedtke 2010, 30). 
• Alternative indicators, such as the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and 
the German National Prosperity Index (NWI), 
are almost redundant for political decisions 
(Gladiator 2010, 71). Although Germany’s 
GDP increased since 2000 continuously, the 
NWI decreased because of increased social 
and ecological costs (ibid., 71). Additionally, 
the New Economy Foundation and Friends 
of the Earth UK developed the Happy Planet 
Index (HPI), in which happiness and the 
ecological footprint are more central than 
the ecological dimension into monetary 
accounting (ibid., 71). 
• The Bertelsmann Foundation (2010, 2) found 
an inherent contradiction in public opinion 
demanding economic growth for the sake 
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of society, but denying its relevance for their 
personal happiness.
But the analysis shows also a change of the exter-
nal environment, which creates opportunities to 
activate the causal mechanisms. Instances are 
• at least slowly changing public preferences 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, 1), 
• some political leaders advocating for post-
growth (Müller 2010, Loske 2010), 
• instances of mass disruption indicating a 
“new willingness to protest” (Habermas 
2011, 10), 
• a few foundations for a legal challenge of 
economic growth (Bundesgesetzblatt 2009, 
n.p., Merkel 2009), and 
• potential windows of reform for post-growth 
around Rio+20 in 2012, as it has been the 
financial crisis for post-growth in 2008 
(Pörsch mann 2011, interview, Schmelzer 
2011, interview, Spangenberg 2011, inter-
view, Zahrnt 2011a, interview).
4.2 Causal mechanisms of change 
towards a post-growth economy
It follows from the analysis of the three condi-
tions, i.e. the movement agents, their strategy 
and the context, that the political impact of 
a social movement depends on internal and 
external variables. Given this, the German envi-
ronmental movement and FoE can (co-)activate 
several causal mechanisms to proceed towards 
a post-growth economy. However, it depends 
on the type of post-growth which mechanisms 
will be activated. While the public preferences 
mechanism, the political access mechanism and 
the disruption mechanism are likely to be acti-
vated for post-growth, the judicial mechanism 
and the international politics mechanism are 
not. Now, I explore these different possibilities to 
use the power of the environmental movement 
for political change towards post-growth one by 
one. 
To some extent the findings in this section are 
based on my own observation referring to the 
theoretical framework since little data is avail-
able on the mechanisms applied for the case of 
post-growth. I intend to give a tentative orienta-
tion for further elaboration. 
4.2.1 Public preferences mechanism:  
a societal capability for post­growth
Large parts of society are required to question 
economic growth in order to make the idea of 
post-growth “gesellschaftsfähig” (Franck 2011, 
interview) and create a “social opportunity struc-
ture” for post-growth (Rochon 1998, 200). The 
German word stands for being able to be carried 
into the mainstream of society and is here trans-
lated as “societally capable”. Building a societal 
capability for post-growth on a large scale can 
make use of the fact, that 61 percent of society 
question already the usefulness of economic 
growth for their individual happiness (Bertels-
mann Foundation 2010, 2). On a second stage, 
economic growth need to be questioned on a 
societal level, where it is still broadly accepted 
by 93 percent of the public (Bertelsmann Foun-
dation 2010, 2). 
The study showed that the public preferences 
mechanism contains two dimensions. On the one 
hand, mainstreaming of the post-growth idea is 
required, indicated by statements from the focus 
group (2011) such as “placing post-growth in the 
middle of society”, “developing and communi-
cating positive visions” and using the “back door 
of hedonism”. If it was broadly communicated by 
mass media or in public events, it would be likely 
to support the polarization of political elites and 
expand the conflict on post-growth (Kolb 2002, 
55) to make the government concerned about 
the decreasing support of unlimited economic 
growth as aim of their politics. 
On the other hand, the analysis of the workshop 
showed, that successfully activating the public 
preferences mechanism goes beyond a “themi-
zation” (della Porta/Diani 2006, 232) or “signal-
ing” of post-growth towards politicians (Kolb 
2002, 55), and includes “value creation” (Rochon 
1998, 54), too. It requires a shift of values, if eco-
nomic growth is not any more the means to free-
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dom as the end or even the end itself, as shown 
in recommendation 2. While in the current value 
system de-growth is seen as standstill or even 
instability, in a post-growth world a regulated 
and actively approached version of de-growth 
has a positive meaning. This is reflected by the 
focus group (2011) as “reducing the fears of 
society towards post-growth” and change the 
negative associations with “standstill”. Cromp-
ton (2010, 11) emphasizes that social movement 
organizations need to address specific values 
in a transparent, non-manipulative way to chal-
lenge the judgement of the people in order to 
move them or at least to avoid their resistance 
towards changing them. 
4.2.2 Policy access mechanism: winning political 
parties as speaking tubes for post­growth
To have a chance to overcome the “resistance in 
politics” against the critique of economic growth, 
as Zahrnt (2011a, interview) recognises, the 
agents of the environmental movement need 
to get access to the policy cycle. Post-growth is 
about “a (re)politicization of the economy” for 
which movement agents are central (Fournier 
2008, 532). In “politicizing” post-growth (Focus 
group 2011), social movements may not be as 
successful as in awareness raising, as della Porta/
Diani (2006, 232) notice, although it is even more 
important to them (Focus group 2011). Currently, 
in particular the Green Party’s policy on green 
growth similar to OECD and UNEP restricts acti-
vating the policy access mechanism (Schmelzer 
2011, interview, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2010, 
n.p.). The few political elites opposing economic 
growth are broadly ignored. Nevertheless, as a 
political speaking tube of the unions, who are a 
part of old social movements, the left-wing party 
and to some extent the Social Democrats are 
promising in facilitating access to the political 
process for post-growth as a new social move-
ment, as follows from the study (see tactic 3) and 
is generally supported by Kriesi et al. (1995, 68). 
Furthermore, the recently initiated commis-
sion of the German Federal Parliament “Growth, 
welfare and well-being — paths towards a sus-
tainable economy and societal progress in the 
social market economy” (Kolbe 2011, n.p.) offers 
a structure to gain access to the political debate 
despite the low expectations towards its output 
(Schmelzer 2011, interview, Spangenberg 2011, 
interview). Unlike the initiatives of several other 
governments such as the Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi 
commission, initiated by the French government 
in 2008 (Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussi 2009), the German 
committee was introduced by request from the 
Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left 
Party in January 2011, and the “final report will 
be voted upon by the legislation” (Spangenberg 
2011, interview). The members of the commis-
sion are nominated by the parties based on their 
strength in parliament and thus are “as conserv-
ative as the political spectrum” (Spangenberg 
2011, interview). 
The environmental movement can access the 
political process on several levels aiming to have 
an “agenda impact”, an “alternatives impact” on 
the content of policy proposals, a “policy impact”, 
an “implementation impact” of public policies, or 
even a “goods impact” referring “to the degree to 
which social movements influence the provision 
of collective or public goods” (all Kolb 2007, 28). 
Yet, this is not done, because the agents of the 
environmental movement themselves have not 
questioned that economic growth as “central 
resource of political feasibility” cannot be over-
come (Metzges 2010, 2). 
4.2.3 Disruption mechanism: benefiting from 
German mass protest mood
The disruption mechanism aims to “overcome 
‘the problem of the powerless’” (Wilson 1961 
interpreted by Kolb 2007, 73) and “stems from its 
ability to destroy the normal functioning of insti-
tutions” (Kolb 2007, 74). To activate it, it is use-
ful, that parts of German society are familiar with 
mass protest and other tactics of direct action, 
indicated by the broad resistance against Stutt-
gart 21, a large rail way project, and the ongo-
ing resistance against nuclear power (Habermas 
2011, 10). 
The disruption mechanism is consistent with 
fair de-growth and emphasizes the far reaching 
claims of a post-growth economy. Some of the 
fair de-growth advocates have their “origins in 
the critique of capitalism” located in the World 
Social Forum milieus of the anti-globalization 
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movement associated with practicing tactics of 
disruption (Spangenberg 2011, interview, also 
Schmelzer 2011, interview). Hence, activating 
the disruption mechanism for post-growth may 
require the revitalisation of this declining move-
ment. 
But I want to underline Tarrow’s general reser-
vation against disruption: “although disruption 
may help to unleash a reform process, it is not 
sufficient to produce significant reforms; rather, 
‘they also require the presence and entrepre-
neurship of well-placed reformists who can turn 
the impetus for change into concrete proposals 
and pilot them through the political process”’ 
(Tarrow 1998, 50 interpreted by Kolb 2007, 76). 
One could even go beyond and say that disrup-
tion contradicts mainstreaming post-growth 
and establishing it in conservative political 
elites. Thus, disruption is essential, but not the 
only mechanism that should be activated by the 
environmental movement. It will only succeed, 
if an elite conflict on post-growth and electoral 
instability occur (Kolb 2007, 83). For both condi-
tions sufficient evidence is lacking. 
4.2.4 Judicial mechanism: a legal foundation for 
post­growth?
The judicial mechanism, which allows social 
movements to make use of the “political power 
of the courts of their behalf” (Kolb 2007, 86), is 
difficult in the case of post-growth, because a 
legal foundation for a post-growth economy is 
missing. Kolb observes that a social movement’s 
influence through legislation is most “under-the-
orized” in the literature (ibid., 86). Nevertheless, 
post-growth fulfils the conditions for activating 
the judicial mechanism: there is lack of a “legal 
precedent” and the access to politics is restricted 
(ibid., 94). Additionally, the German courts are 
strong and relatively political independent (ibid., 
94). In particular, the “growth-enhancement-
law” (Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, Bun-
desgesetzblatt 2009) and the initial statement 
of the German government (Merkel 2009) could 
be challenged by courts through environmental 
movement agents. Since a deep split in political 
elites is necessary for the activation (Kolb 2007, 
241), but only little support by elites such as 
outstanding politicians such as Loske (2010) for 
the Green Party and Müller (2010) for the Social 
Democrats is given, the judicial mechanism 
might have not more than a supporting, indirect 
impact. 
4.2.5 International politics mechanism:  
beyond national economies
One major barrier for a post-growth economy 
is that no single state pioneers for it. Activating 
the international politics mechanism could shift 
the scale of the debate, though, from national to 
international politics (Kolb 2007, 89), where the 
environmental movement can “target interna-
tional organizations”, “boycott global markets” 
and initiate an “international normative dis-
course” (ibid., 90–91). In reverse, international 
post-growth activities could support the national 
ones especially in countries as Germany with a 
relatively open “political institutional structure” 
(ibid., 273). The post-growth theory demands an 
international debate about the re-regulation of 
international commerce, downsizing the World 
Trade Organization and the World Bank and lim-
iting the range of inequality for income distribu-
tion (Daly 2008 as interpreted by CASSE 2011a). 
But in contrast to national debates, an interna-
tional debate on post-growth has not been ini-
tiated yet, partly because many post-growth 
areas are national issues. A global post-growth 
movement is missing. It is not sure, whether the 
fractionated regional and national post-growth 
initiatives will be united in a common move-
ment. Furthermore, international organizations, 
who criticize growth and, thus, open the avenue 
to challenge international politics in their belief 
in economic growth, are absent, too. For now, 
the international politics mechanism does not 
appear as feasible for post-growth. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Post-Growth on the 
Move
5.1 Summarizing statements
The study has shown that post-growth is a 
plausible approach for sustainability under 
the condition, that it takes a critically modern 
approach to either sustainable liberalism or fair 
de-growth, which I have described as the two 
major types of post-growth. Critically modern 
post-growth approaches do not question free-
dom as the end of modernity, but question 
progress as economic growth. The dichotomy 
of ‘progress as development’ and ‘progress as 
growth’, thus, becomes central to the logic of 
the post-growth debate. Where sustainable lib-
eralism and fair de-growth are critically mod-
ern, they have the chance to use each others 
strengths and compensate each others limita-
tions: Under the condition that fair de-growth 
overcomes its eclecticism, they are in combina-
tion most compatible with the urgency of the 
problem while still being feasible. 
This study sees social movements as major 
agents of change for the transition to a post-
growth economy caused by their ability to resist 
the “colonization of the lifeworld by the system” 
(Habermas 1987, 355). It could show that one 
needs not necessarily a post-growth movement 
itself to bring about a post-growth economy 
through social movements. Instead, the German 
environmental movement and, in particular, FoE 
are suitable candidates for post-growth due to 
their broadly established status in society, their 
driving participation in the sustainability dis-
course over decades and their motivation for the 
issue of post-growth. This leads to the approval 
of research question 1. 
Neither a lack in FoE dealing with large-scale 
issues, nor a deficit in academic concepts of 
post-growth, but the missing bridge between 
both causes that FoE is currently not champion-
ing post-growth. This answers research ques-
tion 2. FoE’s impact on the post-growth debate 
depends especially on the communication 
between academics and activists. The idea of a 
post-growth economy can be operationalized 
through popularizing academic findings and 
translating them for social movement organiza-
tions. In particular, ecological economists and 
sustainability scientists bear responsibility to 
operationalize post-growth. Sustainability Sci-
ence can strengthen the bridge between aca-
demia, movements and other actors, but will 
not be able to achieve sustainability by itself. 
This is why also think tanks and experts in the 
post-growth areas are recommended to turn the 
academic knowledge into practical scenarios 
for each area. I suggested the following recom-
mendations for FoE’s adoption of a post-growth 
economy and therewith, I answer research ques-
tion 3: 
1. Post-growth approaches have to be clearly 
distinguished from approaches of ecologi-
cal modernization and sustainable develop-
ment. In contrast to the latter, post-growth 
would re-frame the promises of economic 
growth as myths. 
2. If post-growth is located as critically modern, 
the concepts of progress and development 
for a post-growth economy need further 
examination. 
3. Political and social choice are plausible 
means towards a post-growth economy. 
We can borrow from sustainable liberalism’s 
suggestion for political choice and combine 
rather technocratic, market-centered policy 
instruments with social choice as bottom-up 
debates and activities of the fair de-growth 
advocates. 
4. Areas of a post-growth economy, such as the 
health system, the tax system, the bank sys-
tem, the pension system, the labor market, 
state finances, education and companies, 
need to be identified and complied to nar-
row post-growth down and reduce its cur-
rent abstractness. 
5. An inherent power dilemma between the 
agents of change and the actors of the 
areas, which are required to be transformed 
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towards post-growth, has to be overcome 
while forming coalitions between both 
actors.
Under the condition of having an operational-
ized post-growth strategy with specific aims and 
tactics, appropriate candidates as well as having 
a sufficiently supporting political, economic and 
cultural context, the environmental movement 
can activate in particular two causal mechanisms 
in order to have a positive impact on a post-
growth economy (research question 4): both 
is needed, a “transformation of consciousness” 
through activating the public preference mech-
anism and a “transformation of politics” through 
the activation of the political access mecha-
nism (both Speth 2008, 293). Both are heavily 
restricted by the absence of a deep conflict of 
political and public elites about a sustainable 
economic system. The disruption mechanism is 
promising in the German context since mass pro-
test is becoming a cultural activity among large 
parts of the German population. The activation 
of the juridical mechanism appears as not more 
than a supporting mechanism, if at all, since the 
legal foundation for a post-growth economy is 
missing. The international politics mechanism is, 
due to a lack of international post-growth insti-
tutions, unrealistic to be activated. 
5.2 Outlook: future research and practice
Going beyond the scope of this thesis, a team of 
scientists may identify other social movements 
relevant to post-growth. For instance, a closer 
look at the labor movement and the anti-globali-
zation movement could be fruitful in identifying 
further agents of change for post-growth. Inter-
disciplinary research could address the causal 
mechanisms of change in more detail and do 
empirical work to apply those for post-growth. 
Theoretical work could be done to apply more 
mechanisms on Kolb’s model by social move-
ment scientists. They could identify mechanisms 
for economic and cultural change in addition to 
the mechanisms for political change, that have 
been examined in Kolb’s model so far, to pave 
the way to a more holistic comprehension of 
change. Looking into practice, FoE is well posed 
to be a leading organization for post-growth 
beyond the environmental movement, if they 
can come up with a coherent strategy for post-
growth. This includes an internal post-growth 
check to identify the potential of the organiza-
tion in existing projects, departments and posi-
tions. Speaking about transdisciplinary bridges, 
future work is required to overcome the outsider 
role of those activists who join academic confer-
ences and — vice versa — the outsider role of 
academics who step into the activists’ field. The 
role of these current outsiders is underestimated 
and requires more focus and emphasis. 
5.3 Concluding remarks
Until know I left out one major issue: the ques-
tion, whether a capitalist system may be sus-
tainable without growth or not. Latouche, Daly 
and many ecological economists did not put 
capitalism on their agenda either. One could 
guess, there is a systematic avoidance or even 
fear among those who deal with the ecological 
limits within the economic system, although the 
question raises a number of interesting points. 
In this thesis, I consciously do not point towards 
capitalism for two reasons: first, I keep in mind 
former black-white-discussions on capitalism 
and intend to avoid those, because I assume 
it is not a yes-or-no-capitalism-answer that a 
post-growth society is required to give. Second, 
I question that a clear position towards a capital-
istic system is helpful to establish a post-growth 
economy. Capitalism has many aspects and has 
taken many different shapes. Too many to give 
an adequate answer within the frame of this the-
sis. This is why I stay indifferent towards a post-
growth capitalism. 
Instead of touching upon capitalism in more 
detail, this thesis finishes with stating that the 
idea of post-growth implies mainly a thicker 
conceptualization of value. Growth has become 
a value not only in the economic system, but far 
beyond. The idea of growing has become inher-
ent in social systems and in particular in our 
“mental infrastructures” (Welzer 2011). A very 
narrow, limiting and even understanding of 
growth has colonized most parts of human life. 
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I claim a need for an intra- and inter-systemic 
pluralism of values rejecting reductionist expla-
nations as universal truths. In particular, the eco-
nomic system requires a re-diversification. Dif-
ferent purposes of economies require to be led 
by different logics and not just one in order to 
be sustainable. 
Suddenly, a sharp critique on economic growth 
fuels the discourse on sustainability. After four 
decades, a long, tiring journey from the Limits 
to Growth over Our Common Future to Pros-
perity without Growth accelerates speed by 
academics, who are almost done with drawing 
the road map for a sustainable economy and by 
social movements who are ready to bring about 
change. In this thesis project, both met on an 
imaginary crossing with the motivation to raise 
the interest on each others business. Their alli-
ance is the key to get post-growth on the move. 
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Anhang
For the data collection of this thesis five semi-structured interviews have been done. Additionally, I included a 
part of an interview with Rob Hopkins, who was interviewed by Tina Nyfors. The reference Zahrnt 2011b refers 
to the feedback interview that was done after the focus group workshop.
Franck, Norbert (2011), officer for public relations at Friends of the Earth Germany. Interviewed via telephone at 
February 24, 2011 by the author.
Hopkins, Rob (2011), founder of the transition town movement. Interviewed via telephone at April 5, 2011 by 
Tina Nyfors.
Pörschmann, Robert (2011), spokes person for the department for climate and economy at Friends of the Earth 
Germany. Personally interviewed at January 24, 11 by the author.
Schmelzer, Matthias (2011), co-founder of the blog “Post-Wachstum in Bewegung” (Post-growth in movement, 
Passadakis/Schmelzer 2010b) and co-initiator of the ATTAC-conference “Jenseits des Wachstums” (Beyond 
growth) in May 2011, Berlin. Personally interviewed at January 24, 2011 by the author. 
Spangenberg, Joachim (2011), spokes person of the working group “Economy and Finances” in Friends of the 
Earth Germany. Interviewed via telephone at January 18, 2011 by the author.
Zahrnt, Angelika (2011a), honorary chair person of Friends of the Earth Germany. Interviewed via telephone at 
January 26, 2011 by the author.
Zahrnt, Angelika (2011b), honorary chair person of Friends of the Earth Germany. Interviewed via telephone at 
April 4, 2011 by the author. 
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